Utah Appellate Highlights, Utah Appeals Court, July 2017
Veysey v. Nelson
2017 UT App 77 (May 4, 2017)
On remand from the Court’s prior ruling in Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, 339 P.3d 131, the district court held that laches barred the majority of the mother’s claim for reimbursement of daycare expenses even though the statute of limitations had not yet run.
Phillips v. Dep’t of Commerce
2017 UT App 84 (May 18, 2017)
The court set aside a civil penalty of $413,750 assessed against the petitioner for securities fraud, and returned the case to the agency to reconsider the fine amount. The court held that although the Utah Securities Commission had authority to impose a fine, it could not impose a fine plus targeted assessments for other issues (in this case, investor losses and investigation costs).
Williams v. Anderson
2017 UT App 91 (June 2, 2017)
The court of appeals held the district court erred in applying Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C) to exclude evidence of damages at trial. The court concluded that the initial disclosure provided adequate notice of plaintiff’s method for computing damages because the disclosure indicated that plaintiff was entitled to 30% of the price of a company based upon his ownership interest.
Ostler v. State Retirement Bd.
2017 UT App 96 (June 15, 2017)
In this petition for judicial review of the Retirement Board’s order denying the petitioner retirement benefits, the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the Utah Retirement System forfeiture statute, Utah Code § 49-11-501. It held that because “service credit requires both types of contribution, all of the service credit earned during the period of member contributions is ‘based on’ the member contributions.” Accordingly, the Board correctly held that by withdrawing all of his member contributions, the petitioner forfeited all of his service credits earned during that employment.
State v. Reigelsperger
2017 UT App 101 (June 22, 2017)
A criminal suspect involuntarily committed to a mental health facility by the state for reasons unrelated to the investigation is not in custody for Miranda purposes, because a reasonable suspect would feel free to end the interrogation, even if he or she could not leave the facility, and was not subject to coercive pressures usually present when officers take someone into custody.< Return to overview